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I. INTRODUCTION
Moving to real development in Ecuador and Peru, it is necessary to promote and 
protect the full enjoyment of rights referred to in The Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights2 and other international instruments. One of the most important and 
current concerns is about serious problems faced by the lack of respect for some fun-
damental rights such as the right to property, hence the relevance of some reflections 
on the importance of and the close relationship between the Rule of Law (when the 
law limits the power) versus the Soft Rule of Law3 (when the law reflects and protects 
1  Rubén Méndez Reátegui, Full-tenured Professor of Law and Economic and Group of Research 
on Economic Law (GIDE) coordinator at Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE), visiting 
professor at the Faculty of Law and Human Science of the Universidad Tecnológica del Perú (UTP) and 
researcher at USAL and visiting international professor at U. Externado de Colombia. Email: rcmendez@
puce.edu.ec (main author). In the case of Dr. Mendez, it is stated that this article constitutes an original 
contribution within Project IV (Regulatory Improvement) of the Research Group on Economic Law 
(GIDE) of the Pontifical Catholic University of Ecuador (PUCE) and USAL’s Faculty of Law.
Oscar Sumar Albujar, Dean of the Law School and Law Professor, Universidad Científica del Sur 
(Perú). Project IV (Regulatory Improvement) director. Email: osumar@cientifica.edu.pe (corresponding 
author).
Authors would like to thank Lissangee García Mendoza for her research assistance.
2  The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a common standard of achievements 
for all peoples and all nations. It was proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 
10 December 1948 – General Assembly resolution 217 (III)A.
3  Ghersi, E. (2009). «Las Consecuencias Jurídicas del Mercantilismo» (The Juridical 
Consequences of Mercantilism). Revista El Cato, vol. 9. Consequently, on the one hand, the Rule of Law 
exists when there is separation of powers, when citizens are equal before the law and where the law limits 
the power instead of being reflected. On the other hand, there is a Soft Rule of Law, when the law reflects 
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the power of the government rather than limiting it), human rights and democracy. 
Therefore, this paper will explore the following research questions: 
1. Is the current macro legal framework in Peru and Ecuador consistent with 
what is generally defined as Rule of Law or is it more related to what is 
known as Soft Rule of Law?
2. To what extend does a theoretical analysis support the prevailing of a Soft 
Rule of Law in Ecuador and Peru? 
This paper has been divided into seven sections. Section one refers to a theoretical 
revision of the term Rule of Law, section two presents on the concept of soft rule of 
law, section three focuses on human rights as an essential element of the Rule of Law, 
section four explores the interaction between democracy and the Rule of Law, section 
five refers to the challenges faced by the Rule of Law in a consolidated democracy, 
section six presents, as an example, a brief reflection on the current problems of Peru 
and Ecuador and finally the paper’s conclusions are submitted.
II. THE RULE OF LAW: A CONCISE REVISION
The term Rule of Law has been used in legal science and German4 politics of the 
past century to designate a specific relationship between the political form State and 
the Law, a relationship that goes beyond a limited government that envelops its 
performance in the guise of legal norms.5 
and protects the power of the government rather than limiting it. Therefore, the one who receives 
protection is the political power, not the ordinary citizen, regardless of whether they are rich or poor, 
and their fundamental rights are at risk.
4  The original conception of the term ‘Rule of Law’ has its origin in German doctrine (Rechststaat) 
and is attributed to Robert von Mohl. The term was primarily described in Mohl’s book entitled 
«German Policy Science according to the Principles of the Constitutional State» (Die deutsche 
Polizeiwissenschaftnach den Grundsätzen des Rechtsstaates). For Mohl, the term refers to a social 
scenario where the authority (government) enforcing the law also submits to it. Therefore, the 
government is no longer represented by the people but by the legal rule itself. Then, in a second stage, 
the Rule of Law involves the scope of judicial review of administrative activity. The third stage began 
after the First World War. This time the term Rule of Law included democratic legitimacy of 
government, which also has to be subject to legal rules. For modern legal scholars, the Rule of Law is 
the political organization of social life guided by the principle of legality and respecting all «fundamental 
rights». However, following a classic liberal approach, in this paper the final understanding of the term 
Rule of Law refers to government under the law or the constitutional protection of individual rights. It 
includes a view of limited and efficient small political administration.
5  German doctrine establishes the state on the administrative law about the subjective public 
rights on justice administration, Nolte, G. (1994). «General Principles of German and European 
Administrative Law: A Comparison in Historical Perspective». The Modern Law Review, vol. 57, num. 
2, pp. 191-212; Singh, M. P. (1985). German Administrative Law, Berlin, Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg, pp. 1-377. In other words, it subordinates the administrative power to the budget of 
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The State apparatus (government and administration) is presented with the face 
of the power of supremacy that uses state action against citizens. At this point the 
principle of legality instead of an abstract interpretation of Rule of Law, represents 
the axis of the new state with separation of powers, above all the subordination to the 
law of administrative action (in the formal sense: legislative allocation of power, and 
equipment: eventual internal limiting modes and means of exercise), and a symbol 
of persecution, subordinate to any other, the general interest, otherwise constitutively 
prefigured and determined by the law.6
Therefore, following the approach formerly described, the Rule of Law appears 
as the server, strictly controlled by society; it is subject to a closed system of legal 
rules or simply identified with that system of rules, so it becomes the standard 
procedure.7
It is, consequently, necessary to talk about the theme of the obligation to enforce 
the laws we refer to as some considerations of historical character on the origin and 
the supremacy of law and, therefore, whether it is right to use them to govern. Plato 
stated that the «government of laws» was presented as ideal, in contrast to the «gov-
ernment of men» with its arbitrariness and abuse. Such laws would not be anything 
other than those dictated by reason. Aristotle, in his work «Politics», spoke of the 
laws and principles from human reasoning and relates them to the different forms of 
government defined along the different types of possible Constitutions.8 Meanwhile, 
the philosophers known as stoic explicitly proposed that laws had no other precedent 
than a contractual arrangement amongst the men who then obey; while the so-called 
sophists had suggested at the time that all political truth, including of course the 
laws, emerged from a rhetoric whose ultimate goal was to obtain the citizens’ con-
sent.9 Despite their differences, they all agreed to hold the Rule of Law against the 
despotic ideal, e.g. the supremacy of the Rule of Law on the government of men.10
According to the scholastic Christian thinking that prevailed during the Middle 
Ages, any law, natural or human, was an expression of the will of God, and if some 
attribution by law, it justifies (through complex theoretical devices) the subsistent rights of citizens 
before the State and it predisposes judicial means for protection.
6  Esquivel, J. (1972). «Review of Filosofía del Derecho». Crítica: Revista Hispanoamericana De 
Filosofía, vol. 6 num. 16/17, pp. 142-145; Romero-Pérez, J. E. (1984). «Principio de legalidad», 
Revista de Ciencias Jurídicas, num. 51, pp. 126-138.
7  Egaña, J. (2015). «Estado de Derecho». Ediciones Universidad Católica de Chile (eds.). Derecho 
Constitucional chileno I, Santiago de Chile, Ediciones UC, pp. 291-316. In fact, the Rule of Law, despite 
all the legality and regulations, remains a state, and always contains other specifically political elements 
that are more precise items of Rule of Law. 
8  De Vergottini, G. (2005). Derecho Constitucional Comparado (Comparative Constitutional Law), 
Buenos Aires, Editorial Universidad, pp. 1-908.
9  Prieto Sanchis, L. (2013). El Constitucionalismo de los Derechos (The Constitutionalism of the 
Rights), Madrid, Trotta, pp. 1-312.
10  Esquivel, J. (1972); op. cit., pp. 142–145; Sartori, G. (1998). Ingeniería Constitucional 
Comparada (Comparative Constitutional Engineering), México, FCE, p. 1-261.
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kind of order were to exist in the world, it would come not from men, but God. The 
strength of this conception of power and the right to govern has been one of the most 
powerful in history. The crisis of this conception of the law, like many other medieval 
ideas, would come with the Renaissance (XVI century). It was Machiavelli, in The 
Prince, who made a severe criticism of the idea that the ultimate sovereign in political 
issues is God. The description made of the relations of power as a result of the virtues 
(not moral but practical) and strategies for real men paved the way for the idea that 
laws are derived from the will of men and not of God. Machiavelli, when politics was 
secularised, opened the door to political modernity. Certainly, the loss of God as a 
criterion of justice forced us to seek new grounds for political power and its laws. 
Authors such as Hugo Grocio and Thomas Hobbes named some of them. The first, 
in his work «De jure belli ac pacis»11, trying to justify the existence of certain prin-
ciples that should govern relations between nations, updated the concept of natural 
rights (coming from the Middle Ages) by linking it with the idea that sovereignty 
was an attribute of the States. The idea that there are natural rights that are not lost 
with the contract would not take long to appear, and it would be towards the end of 
the seventeenth century when the philosopher John Locke would reformulate the 
theory of contract from the notion of indispensable individual freedom. With it 
would appear the first formulation of the Rule of Law.12 This English thinker would 
step forward to propose that this legitimacy was not only, as Hobbes asserted, at the 
origin of government and laws, but also in its control and monitoring by citizens and 
civil society.13
Locke’s political ideas offer two distinctive features of the concept of Rule of Law. 
On the one hand, it is believed that the law emanates from the will of the citizens 
and aims to guarantee the exercise of their fundamental freedoms and rights. On the 
other hand, there is the definition of government as an agent of citizens whose power 
is limited by the conditions that constitute its origin, that is to say, by the natural 
rights of individuals. It is important to emphasize, at this point, that the Rule of Law 
is only legitimate if it is supported by acts of free choices of citizens. Consequently, 
the law lacks legitimacy if it is not supported by the decision and surveillance of 
citizens. 
The mere respect for the law only states a «relation of the domain» of agent A 
over agent B; what Locke’s doctrine adds is the rationale for that domain. With this 
interpretation, he established a political doctrine called liberalism, focused on the 
inseparable notions of individual rights and limited government. Thus, the omnip-
otent figure of a despotic government could impose appropriate laws that it deemed 
11  Grotius, H. (1625). The Rigths of War and Peace. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund.
12  Hervada, J. (1996). Historia de la Ciencia del Derecho Natural, Pamplona, Universidad de 
Pamplona, pp. 1-344.
13  Méndez, R. (2013). «An Introduction to Institutional Coordination as An Alternate Model 
for Neo-Institutional Economic Analysis». Procesos de Mercado Revista Europea de Economía Política, vol. 
2, pp. 151-200.
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to be delegitimized on all subjects, and, instead the legitimacy of government and 
laws as an expression of the citizens freely associated were defended.14 The existence 
of natural human rights whose protection is the only legitimate function of govern-
ment, but then restrict the quality of citizens only to property owners, eliminates the 
possibility of political participation and thus exercises their basic concept of most 
human rights of the population. However, the notion of law had been postulated in 
a key that will never be abandoned: his justice linked to public decisions and to 
certain basic human rights.
In the mid-eighteenth century, French philosopher Jean-Jacques Rousseau would 
add new ideas to this notion of law as citizen sovereignty.15 Based on a similar notion 
to that of Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau’s social contract was also raised as an output 
of the state of nature and the inauguration of the politically organized society. How-
ever, the social contract of Rousseau posed no waiver (Hobbes) or delegation (Locke) 
of the natural liberty of individuals through the social contract. For Rousseau, men 
are free by nature, and the renunciation of this freedom would mean to renounce their 
human condition.
The proposed solution by Rousseau is: if all men give up their natural freedom 
and put it into the hands of society (which is constituted by this waiver), but not in 
the hands of any particular individual, they will receive from society the same free-
dom they have given, only now reinforced and protected by the community. In other 
words, men receive civic or political freedom in exchange for their natural freedom. 
Freedom is not lost at any time; rather, it is enriched to allow the full human devel-
opment of all contracting parties. Again, unlike Hobbes and Locke, Rousseau does 
not grant sovereignty to any ruler, but keeps it in the social body created by the 
contract; therefore, the only sovereign are the people themselves, e.g. the political 
community. Every decision, every rule, and every public action should come from 
this deliberative and executive community. Thus, each of the members now becomes 
a citizen not to obey anyone in particular (because no one in particular commands) 
but will continue obeying themselves (because every act of the political community 
is seen as belonging to each individual). The general will, whose objective is not the 
private good of individuals or groups but the common or general good, is expressed 
by laws. These laws are fully legitimate because, coming from the voluntary agree-
ment of men, they simultaneously express the shared interests of all men. The laws 
of individual freedom and social welfare are identified without being subjected to 
contradiction because, in the opinion of Rousseau, individual freedom can only be 
fully exercised within the framework of the general public will that ensures condi-
tions that make this possible.16
14  Méndez, R. (2013); op. cit., pp. 151-200.
15  Hernández, J. L. (1987). «El problema del derecho natural en J.J. Rousseau». Anuario de 
filosofía del derecho, vol. 4, pp. 539-562.
16  Daros, W. R. (2006). «La libertad individual y el contrato social segun J.J. Rousseau». Revista 
Filosofia, vol. 44 num. 111-112, pp. 115-128.
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One of the most precise definitions of the concept of Rule of Law in modern 
thought is probably in the work of the philosopher of the late eighteenth century, 
Emmanuel Kant.17 This thinker tried to justify fully the grounds of public laws on 
reason and individual freedom; he culminates modern social contract tradition adapt-
ing to a justification of the law from the notion of the moral autonomy of individuals. 
This autonomy means nothing more than the absence of external dependencies on 
moral judgment and, therefore, the freedom and moral responsibility of individuals. 
Although Kant develops a whole previous argument of moral order that will serve as 
the basis for his conception of politics and laws, here, we will leave only the Kantian 
idea of self-legislator reason, that is, their idea that the natural freedom of men is 
characterized by the ability to equip themselves with moral and legal laws that guide 
their practical behavior properly.18
If a state can only be the union of free men under legal norms, we already have 
the essential element of the Rule of Law: the «judicialization» policy. When politics 
are governed by general and abstract legal norms, it will result in the protection of 
individual rights through a coercive political power and the limited government 
performance by the citizens’ rights. The most important factor that guarantees these 
rights is the Constitution conceived as a fundamental law whose principles oversee 
the freedom of citizens:
The fact that there is a law and/or approved constitution that is formally admi-
nistered, does not imply ‘Rule of Law’. There may be a law, which does not limit the 
power, but it is an instrument of power. In that case, we are not in a ‘rule of law’, we 
are facing a ‘state of law’.19
So then, no legal system that lacks the minimum requirements reviewed by 
liberal thinkers could be a genuine Rule of Law. Throughout history it shows that 
for many years, men’s will be above the law. The modern idea of Rule of Law arises 
in nascent form in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, when the foun-
dations of world revolutions impel to overcome the absolutism of the monarchy 
through democratic regimes, in which the authoritarian power replaced the monarch 
with a ruler elected by the people and subject to the restrictions, rights and obliga-
tions imposed by the legal systems that sought to protect the freedom of men. 
The Rule of Law represents the confluence of different principles and, established 
by various thinkers, philosophical and political movements and historical forces, 
principles which are embodied in a set of structures and institutions that only in 
recent times have been recognized as congruent elements of a model: The Western 
Liberal State. So then, the concept of Rule of Law is a response to the absolutist state, 
17  Cantillano, H. M. (2014). «Aporte de Kant al concepto Moderno del Estado de Derecho». 
Revista Jurídica IUS Doctrina, vol. 2 num. 3, pp. 1-27.
18  Innerarity, D. (1987). «Libertad e historia en Kant». Thémata, Revista de Filosofía, vol. 4, pp. 
57-77.
19  Ghersi, E. (2009); op. cit., pp. 1-9.
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characterized by the absence of freedoms, the concentration of power and the irre-
sponsibility of the holders of the organs of power.20 Hence the legal guarantee of the 
Rule of Law applicable to modern constitutionalism. During the twentieth century, 
the Rule of Law was established as a counterpoint to totalitarianism. The totalitari-
anism was characterized by the suppression of individual and public freedoms, 
including the outlawing of parties, deliberative bodies, and freedom of transit, assem-
bly, and expression. However, the totalitarianism sought to legitimize through legal 
instruments.21
The concept of Rule of Law is not supported by Kelsen, for whom there is an 
identity of the state order and the legal order. The rule of law is a kind of state con-
sidered as a concept of political, legal and moral theory that defends the premise that 
government authority may only be carried out according to written laws, which must 
have been adopted through an established procedure.22 No State or rights constitute 
a rule of law; only, that state controlled by the law and that legitimate law (demo-
cratic). To summarise, the Rule of Law is that state in which authorities and individ-
uals are governed by law, and it incorporates the rights and fundamental freedoms 
and is applied by impartial and accessible institutions that generate certainty.
III. RULE OF LAW AND SOFT RULE OF LAW
An order or system of organization is essential to bring together knowledge 
(information) and legal knowledge in particular. Therefore, a system for organizing 
this legal knowledge can be developed from mechanisms such as rules.23 This con-
tributes to the knowledge in this area and ensures that it does not remain discrete 
and inaccessible.24 This means that in the legal field, it is also possible to speak of an 
efficient and effective mechanism for signaling the order (Rule of Law). This type of 
mechanism allows a legal organization system and achieves objectives. If it is replaced 
violently and / or irrationally; there would be a problem with the knowledge.
20  Les Benedict, M. (1985). «Laissez-Faire and Liberty: A Re-Evaluation of the Meaning and 
Origins of Laissez-Faire Constitutionalism». Law and History Review, vol. 3 num. 02, pp. 293-33
21  Ghersi, E. (2009); op. cit., pp. 1-9.
22  Following Les Benedict, M. (1985); op. cit., pp. 293-33, but according to Zimmermann, A. 
(2014). «Waiting for the Rule of Law in Brazill: A Meta-legal Analysis of the Insufficient Realization 
of the Rule of Law in Brazil», Silkenat, J., Hickey J. and Barenboim, P. (eds.), The Legal Doctrines of the 
Rule of Law and the Legal State (Rechtsstaat), New York, Springer Nature, pp. 331-347, this is important 
because: «although the meaning of a concept such as the rule of law is open to debate, there is a general 
agreement that is essentially concerned with protecting the individual from unpredictable and arbitrary 
interference with their vital interest».
23  North, D. C. (1990). Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic Performance. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 15-152.
24  Hayek, F (1979). «The Road to Serfdom» (Sixth chapter: Planning and the Rule of Law), 
Hamowy, R. (ed.), The Constitution of Liberty, Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, pp. 101-107.
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This is precisely the kind of problem that stems from excessive control of indi-
viduals’ actions (allocation of rights) and is expressed in the establishment of a closed 
system of legal planning by the government (Soft Rule of Law).25 The prevalence of 
this closed system affects civil society and its essential component, the individual, as 
has been described in Table 1.
This review allows us to infer the need for a system where the Rule of Law pre-
vails over the Soft Rule of Law. This proposal of an environment where an open order 
prevails and is not subject to central planning or the mandates of the ruling can be 
linked to that called the «spontaneous organization system of social activity»26. For 
this, it is essential to consider other aspects such as a vision of social cooperation 
among freemen and the requirement of an open order developed from reasonable legal 
and moral rules. The latter is then established as a component of the «basic necessity» 
for peaceful coexistence, understood as a condition inherent in any model that pursues 
growth and the political, social and economic development of a country.
The above can argue that the prevalence of the Rule of Law expressed through a 
macro device such as the constitution or law of laws, is not equivalent to the preva-
lence of an irrational rule where the government of the day establishes rules by decree 
and under the cover of a constitution which is shown as a useful device to formalize 
the establishment of privileges, that is to say, unequal treatment for all. This is so, 
although there may be technical reasons holding all kinds of ‘positive’ demonstration, 
even the Soft Rule of Law is an expression of a prone collective likely to be corrected 
or self-developed through its own internal rules.
The idea of the prevalence of a Rule of Law that reflects the prevalence of general 
rules of conduct must be the product of cultural evolution and knowledge (or infor-
mation) that individuals acquire over time through trial and error. This is distin-
guished from the model Rule of Law understood from the proposal of authors such 
as Hume. A constitutional model governed by a Rule of Law can be expressed 
through the rescue of the values of liberalism of the xix century27 and is based on a 
spontaneous evolution that is the product of human actions but not of human design.
If it is considered that order or system of organization is essential for binding 
legal knowledge, it must also be considered that individuals in the exercise of free-
dom, take action (juridical) based on the information they have and this information 
25  However, it is used by well-meaning people. It is often belittled and presented under the label 
of thought or expression related to outdated nineteenth-century ideas, i.e. ideas overtaken by the more 
progressive literature.
26  Vid. Hayek, F (1979); op. cit., pp. 101-107.
27  As argued by Hayek, F (1979); op. cit., pp. 101-107.
The rules of just conduct are, with some exceptions, related to family law, negative rules, according 
Sartori, G. (1998); op. cit., p. 1-261, because what they do is prohibit unfair conduct by individuals. 
They cannot simply impose behavior (positive rules) unless through their actions they have taken 
responsibility for doing something positive. The rules of conduct must not confer rights on individuals. 
Rather, they must establish the conditions under which people can acquire those rights.
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must reach an integrated character that in its essence is characterized for being scat-
tered in pieces and incomplete.
This becomes more important when it brings up the role of Rule of Law. A for-
mal analysis of that part of its development, in reality, cannot be confined to the 
establishment of abstractions that evoke the so-called equilibrium model expressed 
mainly through tautologies. The empirical element of the Rule of Law, therefore, 
consists of propositions about the acquisition of information and technical assump-
tions that are not inspired by radical legal positivism.
This is the case due to the concept of equilibrium that is only valid within the 
scope of the individual and the actions of this as part of a plan. It makes no sense to 
speak of equilibrium applied to a (competitive) society organized through an open 
order or Rule of Law, where individual acts according to their plan and the informa-
tion it holds.28 Thus, an individual can be balanced, but a group of individuals and 
an organization system could not be unless one person (dictator) makes all decisions 
over others or the plans and/or activity (legal) of all of them are compatible because 
they are based on the same expectations and the same information. So, there can only 
exist a tendency toward equilibrium, that is, under certain conditions, the information 
and intentions of the different members of society could achieve some degree of 
compatibility. But for there to be a real balance in the legal system, this would have 
to be perfect, that is, that all information must be known as soon as it originates in 
its entirety and without being prone to error or possessing any hermeneutical mis-
takes. Thus the prevalence of a scenario of Rule of Law is identified with a scenario 
where the spontaneous actions of the individuals come first in full exercise of their 
rights (e.g. Civil Liberties) and not a scenario of Soft Rule of Law that results from a 
single plan (product of social mind) that can theoretically exist only in a totalitarian 
state.
Introducing a critique of closed organizational systems means criticizing the 
existence of environments where a Soft Rule of Law prevails in a scenario that is 
characterized by the problem of legal planning. All government activity is the prod-
uct of legal planning, based naturally on the information that the ruler possesses. The 
question is, whether to plan through a closed system or through a framework of rules 
with a valid propensity of general and abstract mechanisms where institutional com-
petition is present and so rules are understood from a parameter of evolution and/or 
involution not run by a social Darwinism.
From the above, it is considered that a system where the Rule of Law prevails is 
superimposed on an organized system through attached guidelines to the Soft Rule 
of Law because it allows better use of existing juridical information without coercing 
negative rights and denying the existence of particular circumstances of time and 
space. This relates to society with its mechanisms of legal governance addition and 
provides a system where the Rule of Law prevails and contributes to the rapid adap-
28  According to Hayek, F (1979); op. cit., pp. 101-107.
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tation of their different social components through its signaling mechanisms (social 
cooperation between agents) and is rooted in an element such as social legitimacy at 
the expense of legal interventionism. 
Based on the established laws, the role of the government should be limited 
primarily to provide the framework in which individuals can freely pursue their 
objectives in a coordinated manner. When the common man, although he does not 
possess any power, can engage freely in cooperative activities with other men, this 
can only produce good things such as the eradication of subservience and political 
patronage.29 This, in turn, provokes the empowerment of economic freedom (e.g. Free 
enterprise), competition, private property and limited government.
This is important because without freedom in economic matters there cannot 
exist personal and political freedom tutored by legal rules. A feedback process occurs 
where issues such as economic freedom open doors so that there is free use of infor-
mation (new knowledge) which settles the system of legal organization (Rule of Law) 
and makes major advances in a society multiply exponentially, regardless of aspects 
rescued by other authors such as the struggle between social classes, domination and 
others.
An approach like the one proposed that was developed from the methodological 
subjectivism does not criticize the goals of equality and justice pursued by the legal 
order. Choosing not to question the preponderance of a system where the Soft Rule 
of Law stands is considered the most successful way to try and achieve goals «socially 
relevant».30 In this regard, it states that a system should prevail in which the coercive 
power held by the government is limited to creating the conditions under which 
individuals can develop their initiatives and plan more successfully or if the rational 
use of tangible and intangible resources are inherent in themselves.
The establishment of a system where a scenario of Rule of Law is prevalent means 
that government, in all its actions, is restricted by the rules fixed and announced 
beforehand. This makes it possible to predict with relative certainty how the govern-
ment will use its power of coercion under given circumstances and allows the indi-
vidual plan according to their knowledge about how the government will present it. 
There is, then, room for arbitrariness, prerogative and discretionary authority. When 
an individual knows the rules of the game, they are free to pursue its goals with the 
confidence that the government’s power will not be used to thwart their efforts. As 
soon as the government begins to arbitrarily change the rules and to balance interests 
against each other, it begins to affect civil society and their inherent rights. Therefore, 
in a scenario of Rule of Law, it emerges that the rules are effective and legitimate 
when always applied in the same manner, without exception; that is, without pursu-
ing the benefit of a specific group to the detriment of the rest. However, there is 
protection on legal-social technicalities.
29  Ghersi, E. (2009); op. cit., pp. 1-9.
30  Méndez, R. (2013); op. cit., pp. 151-200.
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Therefore, the Rule of Law is not synonymous with the power of the government 
to legislate. This introduces a difference with a system of Soft Rule of Law where the 
actions of a government can be legally valid but fail to conform to the law and its 
general principles. This difference means understanding the limits of the law when 
it is directed towards a particular group, whether to encourage it or to discriminate 
against it. A system of Rule of Law is one that is governed by rules of just conduct 
where no concept of unlimited government stands. It aims to allow individuals to 
achieve their goals or objectives in conditions of freedom.31 These are conditions 
where everyone can use the information, they have to attempt to achieve their targets 
without affecting general principles of good governance whose primary search is the 
protection of freedom. It, therefore, rejects the mere transfer of vague rules and safe 
behavior. This means that a system of Rule of Law should not necessarily be delimited 
through being exposed by authors such as Bacon, Hobbes and Austin: social con-
structivism and the belief that there is a supreme authority, monarch or democratic 
assembly, with power unlimited and all that this legislator supreme decree is a law 
and only it can enact proposed changes. In other words, only it can make the law 
(constitution) into an instrument to use power instead of what should limit the use 
of power. A system of Rule of Law then also diverges from a system of Soft Rule of 
Law as it is effective as a power to legislate; it is effectively limited by legitimate 
institutional padlocks from the social point of view and not merely legal.32 As 
explained, it means that in a context of Soft Rule of Law, instruments such as the 
constitution fail to confine to the organizational rules of government but allow the 
emergence of a superstructure that supports rules that directly or indirectly and 
repeatedly limit citizenship without plausible justification as the generation of «real 
negative externalities»33 or asymmetric transfer of social costs.34
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE RULE OF LAW
The above definition is achieved to identify clearly which requirements are nec-
essary for forming a Rule of Law. Among the elements, we can say that this «separa-
tion of powers» is a basis for the distribution of power in different functions and 
ensures that the state power is not concentrated in a single institution, but it is 
distributed, allowing greater efficiency and proper controls avoiding arbitrariness and 
31  Hayek, F (1979); op. cit., pp. 101-107.
32  Therefore, the Rule of Law represents the pathway through which the emergence of an ideal 
constitution becomes feasible, that is, one that manages to provide the greatest possible freedom to 
organize the laws so that the freedom of each one can coexist with the freedom of all. 
33  Posner, R. A. (2014). Economic Analysis of Law, Madrid, Fondo de Cultura Económica de 
España, pp. 16-752.
34  Ghersi, E. (2009); op. cit., pp. 1-9.
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the abuse of it. In ancient times, the appropriateness of the control and balance of 
power was addressed through confrontation and the cooperation of various forces. 
However, unlike the old conception, where the elements of the «mixed consti-
tution» can be linked to groups and defined social classes (e.g., nobles and common-
ers), the modern view takes as its starting point the differentiation of functions and, 
consequently, organs within the institutional apparatus of the state which have 
become relatively autonomous from society. «Power ought to serve as a check to 
power»35 remains the principle of the separation of powers, whether it should take a 
more confrontational style, as in the presidential system of the United States, or a 
more cooperative one, such as in the European parliamentary regime.36 
Another element is the Rule of Law, which provides legal certainty and security, 
that is, the ability to calculate the consequences of their actions concerning to other 
individuals or in connection with public power. With this element, we understand 
obedience to the established rules, because the rules should be an expression of the 
popular will and must submit to it both rulers and those who are ruled, the principle 
of legality: Every act of the state organs must be founded and motivated by the law 
in force. That is, that every act of public authority must be based on an existing legal 
standard and, further, that statute must find its way of living at a higher standard. 
The principle of legality responds to the contrast between the government of men 
and the Rule of Law, according to which, in the first case, the governed are unpro-
tected against the discretion of the ruler and, secondly, subjects have means of under-
standing the limits and scope of the exercise of authority. This dichotomy involves a 
value judgment: in the case of the governed, legality prevails where they enjoy cer-
tainty and legal security and there is, in principle, equality before the law (Greek 
ideal of isonomy); where the law is a principle absent, the rulers have absolute dis-
cretion to affect the lives of their subjects.
Another element has also been identified; there are institutional guarantees of 
certainty, fairness and access, which means that the dynamic aspect of the law (appli-
cation of rules to specific cases) is executed by impartial and accessible institutions 
(previously established courts) that generate certainty through procedures accessible 
for all (equal access to justice) and aim to ensure that all penalties are founded and 
motivated in law. That is, the authorities can do nothing that is not covered by the 
law; any possible involvement of individual rights must be properly grounded and 
justified by a rule, while the affected should have the opportunity to defend them-
selves and to be heard (right to a hearing or principle of due process). It should be 
noted that this feature is undoubtedly at the heart of every modern constitutional 
state since in the application of laws and effective daily relations of the regulatory 
body, these are subjects under their rule.
35  Montesquieu, C. D. S. B., Carrithers, D. W., & Baron de Montesquieu, C. D. S. (2001). 
The spirit of laws, Batoche, pp. 20-714.
36  De Vergottini, G. (2005); op. cit., pp. 1-908.
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An essential element of the Rule of Law is: The recognition of the fundamental 
rights and freedoms of individuals, and the establishment of safeguards to ensure 
their effective protection. The Rule of Law refers to a particular institutional design 
to protect and guarantee the fundamental rights of persons, intended to guide, con-
trol, and limit the exercise of public power through general rules, which make up a 
clear and known system for all. 
As we have seen, the situation of human rights is in vogue and it is no surprise 
that now this respect and these guarantees are given within an orderly and dutiful 
legal framework that also provides the mechanisms or resources that can be brought 
in cases of abuse or some violation of these rights. For French and American revolu-
tionaries, the protection of human rights was the foundation and purpose of social 
institutions. There are innate rights prior and superior to the State and only it can 
recognize rights. However, to secure them and as a form of guarantee, these rights 
are proclaimed solemnly in a statement so that the acts of the legislature and the 
executive can be compared at any moment to the aim of any political institution, and 
are most respected; so that the complaints of citizens, founded henceforth on simple 
and indisputable principles, always contribute to the maintenance of the Constitution 
and to the happiness of all. If these criteria are met, the chances of the governed 
achieving acceptable levels of legal certainty and security will increase. However, we 
can still go further: to some scholars, the Rule of Law must involve the democratic 
principle and the notion of fundamental rights. From this perspective, the concept 
takes on a broader dimension: it is a democratic Rule of Law because the existence of 
standards with certain characteristics is not enough; they must be the indirect expres-
sion of the popular will. 
So, stable, clear public and general laws that are issued by a popularly elected 
Legislative Power who contemplate the fundamental human rights, paired with a fair 
judicial system, whose judges (applicators of law) are aligned to legal procedures that 
found and motivate their sentences, is the formula that results in a democratic rule 
of law. 
V. RULE OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY
The concept of Rule of Law gives us a comprehensive reflection on the field of 
politics, the values and legal principles; primarily on the basic structure of society, 
that is to say, in the system of basic institutions that allow the qualification of democ-
racy for a given society. The truth is that there are democratic and legal societies 
where wealth distribution is more limited than in others, or where the criteria for 
establishing penalties could be considered as being excessively severe; but it is not 
the distance between authoritarianism and democracy, but a distance within the 
model itself of Rule of Law. 
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There are, indeed, vast differences between social systems of different democratic 
countries, although these differences have more to do with the institutions of distrib-
utive justice and social services than with the legitimacy of the law. Some seem fairer 
to us, others more restrictive, but they all share a similar legal structure that allows 
us to classify within the grounds. Therefore, it is necessary to emphasize that the Rule 
of Law is not equivalent to social justice, but, and this is essential, any reasonable 
model of social justice can be achieved only through the channels of the Rule of Law. 
Similarly, democracy is not equivalent to an equitable distribution of wealth; 
only by democratic powers is it possible to distribute social wealth without serious 
injustice and bloodshed. In any event, the Rule of Law promotes abundant space for 
the reform of existing institutions and the search for legitimate social projects that 
are supported from the plurality of collective life.37 
The Rule of Law collides with totalitarian and authoritarian systems, e.g. the 
systems where there is no effective control over the government and the basic rights 
of citizens are not respected. Its basic principle is that not all law is desirable, even 
if it is effective. History has recorded legal systems that cannot be considered genuine 
Rule of Law.38 The legality established by the Nazi government (Nationalsozialstischen 
Rechtsstaat), the legality of Franco (the Fundamental Laws of the State) and the legal-
ity of the organized communist countries politically and legally, from the assumption 
of the revolutionary party supremacy, are examples of legal systems, all with good 
performance and prolonged application, which could not be described as Rule of 
Law.39
Democracy is made, then, as a model with four dimensions, each corresponding 
to the four types of fundamental rights; political rights, civil rights, rights of freedom 
and social rights. The first two types of rights, called secondary, formal or instrumen-
tal rights, place legitimacy in the sphere of politics and economics, and therefore, 
formal and multi-dimensional political civil democracy. The other two types of rights 
(of freedom and social) are called primary; substantial or final framework that can do 
what is forbidden to the political and economic empowerment of people, basing the 
legitimacy of the substance on the decisions and so on the substantial dimension of 
democracy. The political dimension is the basis of the other three, in the absence of 
which one cannot speak of democracy. However, it is insufficient to define democra-
cy, so it requires the four dimensions together to discuss constitutional democracy, 
37  Ghersi, E. (2009); op. cit., pp. 1-9.
38  O’donnell, G. (2005). «Democracia y Estado de Derecho» (Democracy and the Rule of Law). 
Nexos, vol. 325, p. 19.
39  Zimmermann, A. (2012). «Marxismo, comunismo y derecho: cómo el Marxismo llevó al 
desorden y al genocidio en la antigua unión soviética». Revista de Economía y Derecho, vol. 9, p. 34; 
Zimmermann, A. (2010). «Evolutionary legal theories: the impact of Darwinism on western 
conceptions of law». Journal of Creation, vol. 24 num. 2, pp. 103-111; Zimmermann, A. (2008). «The 
Politics of Lawlessness in Brazil: How Brazilian Politics overrides the Rule of Law». ELaw - Murdoch 
University Electronic Journal of Law, vol. 15 num. 1, pp. 3-42.
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based on which eludes all decisional power, both public and private and the availa-
bility of fundamental rights as a whole.
The paradigm of constitutional democracy was imposed after the Second World 
War to prevent experiences of the Nazi or fascist type from being broken hereinafter. 
The consequences of this model are that citizens become holders of fundamental 
rights. Therefore, people acquire an over-ordered location to set public and private 
powers, which are linked to fundamental rights, where sovereignty resides in the only 
sense in which it is still permissible to use this old word. The substantial concept of 
democracy40 places democracy in a policy area: model as embodied in their respect 
and subordination to the rigidly established Constitution. This substantial democ-
racy is the necessary complement of formal democracy (polyarchy), because democ-
racy is the form, but also the substance.
VI. RULE OF LAW AND CONSOLIDATED DEMOCRACY
The main political challenge of consolidating democracy to enforce the Rule of 
Law is to equalize the concepts of legality and legitimacy, to clarify the concept of 
democratic and legitimate (different from authoritarianism) and encourage civic 
authority to enforce the government actions.41
Matching the concepts of legality and legitimacy is not only a task of govern-
ment, where the legitimacy is the result of the law, but also the general public should 
support the establishment of legality as an indispensable element of social demands. 
Therefore, the public must banish the idea that only a few can enforce the Rule of 
Law; they must rely on their institutions and assert their right to demand accounts 
based on the law that gives the Rule of Law, which the supposedly democratic regime 
built. Thus, the biggest challenge is to abide by the Rule of Law by promoting 
changes that become fairer and equitable compared to their subsequent legitimacy.
Thus, the application of the Rule of Law in Ecuador and Peru must go hand in 
hand with overcoming a legitimacy based on impunity and the negotiation of law. 
On the other hand, the socio-economic challenge to close the gap of inequality and 
poverty implies the implementation of effective policies and non-welfare, eradicating 
populist discourse at the time of its implementation, strengthening the enforcement 
and administration of justice, effectively combatting poverty by improving the effec-
tive public investment in education, health and housing, and improving the overall 
safety of the population.
Without these previous political and social changes, it is impossible to assert the 
Rule of Law and a democracy without Rule of Law is a fragile, unsustainable and 
40  Proposed by Ferrajoli, L. (2004). Derechos y Garantías. La ley del más débil (Rights and 
Guarantees. The law of the weakest), Madrid, Trotta, pp. 15-177.
41  Ghersi, E. (2009); op. cit., pp. 1-9.
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inequitable one. Thus, democratic consolidation requires legality and the legitimacy 
of governments, requiring careful public accounts, economic and social development, 
institutional strength and a new culture of legality.
VI.1. Rule of Law and State Reform
For some authors, the role of constitutional law in complex societies of our time 
should be reduced to serving as a channel and ensuring the conditions of political 
exchange or the public sphere of discussion42, or to regulate the procedures to main-
tain political pluralism. This would ensure that the political majority occupied at 
any given time and the government cannot block the passage to minorities who may 
want to enter in the future.43
Some authors offer a more demanding vision of the role of constitutional law in 
democratic states. For example, that fundamental rights, which are essential elements 
of any constitutional state, are something like the «substantial part» of a democracy, 
as they have what the government should do (e.g. social rights) or cannot do (e.g. 
restricting rights of freedom).44 Fundamental rights are characterised «precisely 
because they are equally guaranteed to all and withdrawn from the market availabil-
ity and politics (…); and act as actors not only legitimately but also, and above all, 
as factors of legitimization of decisions and non-decisions».45
In fact, a solid Rule of Law instead of Soft Rule of Law is essential for any dem-
ocratic regime because: «The rule of law is a cornerstone of any democracy of good 
quality»46. Therefore, what does legal regulation add to democratic pluralism? First-
ly, stability. Secondly, predictability. Thirdly, it is through legal rules as the place 
and role of each of the acting subjects in a democratic context (political parties, public 
authorities, citizens, media, etc.) is delimited.
What could bring the law and specifically the constitutional law to the process 
of the development of democratic systems such as Ecuador and Peru? Surely a great 
deal, because the legal and constitutional institutions require a consolidated democ-
racy. This scenario is still far from being achieved in these countries. That is why in 
these countries they are still currently discussing the ‘state reform’ and the prevalence 
of the Soft Rule of Law over the Rule of Law.
The state reform may have an impact on the democratic quality of Ecuador and 
Peru if it can solve at least the following scenarios:
a) Better regulation of fundamental rights; even more, adequately enunciating 
some rights that already exist and are incorporating others. It is necessary to 
42  Habermas, J. (1998). Facticidad y Validez (Facts and Validity), Madrid, Trotta, pp. 12-196.
43  Sartori, G. (1998); op. cit., p. 1-261.
44  Ferrajoli, L. (2004); op. cit., pp. 15-177.
45  Vid. Ferrajoli, L. (2004); op. cit., pp. 15-177.
46  As pointed out by O’donnell, G. (2005); op. cit., p. 19.
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develop and consider the impact of the right to personal and familial priva-
cy, the right to honor, and the right to self-image. In the medium term, the 
possible inclusion of further development of constitutional property rights 
over natural resources must be considered.
b) The redesigning of the relationship between the branches and levels of 
government, to introduce incentives for cooperation and not only for the 
confrontation between powers. To achieve this, the creation of mechanisms 
such as budget initiatives renewal or urgency (which must be discussed by 
the legislature within a short period) needs to be considered. 
c) Regarding the design of the government system in Ecuador and Peru, it 
would have to weigh the necessity of moving to a system where the powers 
of local authorities are no longer determined by their economic capacity and 
its management strength.
d) Having better instruments for judicial review that are consistent with the 
speech that identifies the relevance of having a constitutional court. In 
Ecuador and Peru, it would require the reformation of the «writ of Amparo» 
(Peru) or «action of protection» (Ecuador) and would improve the system of 
constitutional controversies and actions of unconstitutionality. Key issues to 
be discussed at this point would be at least the active and passive standing 
in the process of constitutional review, and the effects of judgments.
e) Providing mechanisms to improve public deliberation at various levels and 
instances, for example, through the enlarged standing to ‘writ of Amparo’ or 
‘action of protection’ and constitutional review procedures.
Departing from a comparative experience, is it necessary to build a new consti-
tutional model for Ecuador and Peru? The question that is relevant now, in light of 
what has just been discussed, is whether the necessary reforms can be made under the 
current constitutional framework or whether it is necessary to move towards new 
texts.
This is an important topic on the agenda of Ecuadorian and Peruvian constitu-
tionalism. In recent years, it has been discussed whether or not these countries need 
a new constitution in light of the challenges that the evolving political and social 
scenario currently requires. The positions are divided on the matter because, while 
for some doctrine there is nothing salvageable in their current constitutions, for 
others the debate on constitutional renewal is secondary and should be addressed 
within the next few decades. To summarize, the topic of constitutional renewal in 
Ecuador and Peru can be divided into three main positions. The first argues the rel-
evance of continuing with the current constitutional models, adapting if at all, with 
small changes in character, especially under the constitution. Undergoing a major 
reform process that has been carried out in both cases brought about truly new con-
109_Revista_Derecho_Politico.indd   391 17/11/2020   11:41:49
RUBÉN MÉNDEZ REÁTEGUI - OSCAR SUMAR ALBUJAR
© UNED. Revista de Derecho Político
N.º 109, septiembre-diciembre 2020, págs. 373-400
392
stitutional text in the Peruvian Constitution of 199347 and the Ecuadorian Consti-
tution of 2008. To that extent, all that would be required are some additional 
adjustments. For a second position, it requires a total change. The third option 
maintains that many changes are needed in order to close an era, even symbolically, 
and to open a new stage in the democratic life of these countries.
In the Peruvian case, the first option, represented by very eminent jurists, does 
not seem difficult to sustain. The reasons for this are quite simple: Peru has a rela-
tively stable social and political reality and has a constitution that can be fully inter-
preted. However, the Ecuadorian case refers to a different juridical scenario. Despite 
the relative political and social stability of Ecuador, there are several rights (e.g. 
constitutional property rights) that cannot be efficiently protected. Also, for this 
latest case, there are institutional arrangements that are dysfunctional for partisan 
balances that arise as a result of the lack of political pluralism.48
In conclusion, the need for further research to identify which is the best medi-
um-term solution that can be stated, both from a theoretical and political perspective, 
will convene to issue a new constitution in the case of Ecuador and to develop better 
constitutional property rights for Peru. There is no doubt that both scenarios should 
guide the debate on democratic consolidation and the development of institutional 
quality for both countries.
VII. SOFT RULE OF LAW IN ECUADOR AND PERU
Peru and Ecuador are passing through a period of institutional instability that 
has affected their governance and their guarantees of democratic consolidation so that 
today it is necessary to question the feasibility of creating a democratic state of law 
and overcoming the prevailing Soft Rule of Law in both countries.
It may be noted that due to high transaction costs, enforcement and management, 
the prevailing institutional framework is prevented in practice and an important sector 
of the population has access to legal certainty and legality, while certain tolerant 
groups are openly placed above the law. Thus, on the one hand, the costs and benefits 
of Law are not distributed equitably and, on the other, some fail to comply without 
facing punishment, which represents an incentive for others to do the same. The seri-
ousness of this situation is that it is mainly the government that disobeys the law.
Paradoxically on paper, the Constitutions of both countries contemplate some 
elements of a discredited state which overlays a modern state of law. Therefore, the 
problem in both countries is that they have a clear origin in the design of their rules. 
This has limited Peru and Ecuador in their attempts to be recognized as countries 
47  Rubio Correa, M. (1999). Estudio de la Constitución Política de 1993 (A Revision of the Political 
Constitution of 1993), Lima, PUCP Fondo Editorial, pp. 177-326.
48  Aoki, M. (2001). Toward a comparative institutional analysis, MIT press, pp. 1-560; Ferrajoli, 
L. (2004); op. cit., pp. 15-177.; Méndez, R. (2013); op. cit., pp. 151-200.
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that have exceeded the material poverty and the inequality of economic, social, polit-
ical and legal framework; asserting them as countries that have managed the imple-
mentation and respect for the law. Although, from the standpoint of the «democratic 
principle», both countries have progressed differently for civil society in the field of 
respect for the law they are still in diapers. In both countries the law is violated daily, 
starting with the governors and also the governed: the law is violated for individual 
benefits or worse, it is violated based on personal conceptions of what the law should 
be. In both countries, the legal order and justice systems are serious problems. To 
begin, we can say that neither country has a clear set of principles and rights respected 
by all. On the contrary, both authorities and individuals often flout the rules, which 
means that there is no certainty in social interactions.49
The application of the Rule of Law requires clear rules, enforceable sanctions, 
and a culture of legality. Unfortunately, Peru and Ecuador still lack a culture of 
constitutionality, legality and respect for the Rule of Law to limit the prevalence of 
a system that reflects and protects the power of the government rather than limiting 
it. This is important as Hayek analyzed that this «means that government in all its 
actions is bound by rules fixed and announced beforehand»50. From this point of 
view, data from the Institutional Quality Indexes for 2012, 2013, 2014, 2015 and 
2016 shows that Peruvian and Ecuadorian democracy has been cemented to a weak 
culture of effective protection of fundamental rights such as the right to property. 
This is the result of the distrust of citizens regarding their institutions (Soft Rule 
of Law). Also, various traces of authoritarianism limiting voice and accountability 
are still in force between the population and various socio-legal conditions are 
adverse throughout the country. Table 1 describes data referring to the prior 
description below:
Table 1: Institutional Quality Indexes 2012 - 2016









Canada 7 0,9397 0,94 0,95 0,95
Chile 22 0,8478 0,88 0,82 0,89
Peru 68 0,5598 0,33 0,50 0,57
Ecuador 144 0,2821 0,12 0,38 0,35
Cuba 188 0,1488 0,34 0,07 0,67
49  Aoki, M. (2001); op. cit., pp. 1-560.
50  Hayek, F (1979); op. cit., pp. 101-107.
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Institutional Quality Index 2013
Canada 7 0,9315 0,9474 0,9559 0,9524
Chile 22 0,8436 0,8821 0,8019 0,8814
Peru 60 0,6174 0,3302 0,5377 0,5367
Ecuador 143 0,2907 0,1226 0,3368 0,4294
Cuba 176 0,1420 0,3255 0,0802 0,6497
Institutional Quality Index 2014
Canada 6 0,9398 0,9474 0,9559 0,9524
Chile 22 0,8278 0,8804 0,8039 0,8690
Peru 68 0,5596 0,3349 0,5147 0,4821
Ecuador 144 0,2895 0,1388 0,3971 0,3690
Cuba 188 0,0112 0,3254 0,0686 0,6726
Institutional Quality Index 2015
Canada 7 0,9333 0,9481 0,9481 0,9486
Chile 22 0,8417 0,8774 0,8443 0,9486
Peru 63 0,6072 0,3349 0,5094 0,4743
Ecuador 151 0,2650 0,1840 0,3915 0,3690
Cuba 173 0,1426 0,3208 0,0991 0,6457
Institutional Quality Index 2016
Canada 6 0,9398 0,9474 0,9559 0,9524
Chile 22 0,8278 0,8804 0,8039 0,8690
Peru 68 0,5596 0,3349 0,5147 0,4821
Ecuador 144 0,2895 0,1388 0,3971 0,3690
Cuba 188 0,0112 0,3254 0,0686 0,6726
Source: Fundación Libertad & Progreso (Progress & Freedom Foundation)
We see an example in the economic rights enshrined at the constitutional level 
in both jurisdictions, the law formally establishes an explicit prohibition of private 
monopolies, while it was decided to privatize public corporations without mecha-
nisms to ensure competition fully.51
51  Méndez, R. (2014). «Una nota crítica a propósito del libro Why Nations Fail. The Origins of 
Power, Prosperity, and Poverty». Lecturas de Economía, vol. 80, pp. 211-218.
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The current situation of the Rule of Law in both countries regarding the essential 
elements concerning the respect and guarantees of the fundamental rights that have 
been verified are very serious issues of the violation of human rights, mainly by the 
police and army that include the illegal detention, torture and killing of people. This 
situation has only been aired before the judiciary without ever reaching a real cleans-
ing by International Transparency of the corruption that plagues both countries. 
First, because of the difficulty of proving such illegal acts procedurally. Secondly, it 
has been difficult for the judiciary to issue effective penalties, since many of the 
injured people belong to low-income groups and thus is not in a position to meet the 
costs of litigation and hire lawyers of respectable quality. Finally, the problem of 
widespread corruption far exceeds in scope, case by case, the court sentences. 
The seriousness of the violation of human rights is such that it was necessary to 
create an agency dedicated exclusively to research and to control such abuses similar 
to those that exist in other countries under the name of «Ombudsman» (attorney or 
representative of the people, in Swedish). However, these agencies have been incapa-
ble of addressing the issues of the violation of human rights and the institutionali-
zation of corruption.
Hence, this does not constitute an «initial social pact» in the contractual lan-
guage of philosophers and liberal thinkers, but an amalgam of often irreconcilable 
political projects, if the constitutions of both countries do not constitute a coherent 
legal system, it cannot be expected that laws in general, and the administration of 
justice in particular, address the challenge of modernization.
In short, one can see that Ecuador and Peru, despite the many efforts that have 
been made, have not managed to establish a government that meets these minimum 
requirements of effectiveness and legality. Despite the lack of a judiciary capable of 
imposing order to bureaucracy and individuals to be subject in all cases to law, there 
is not, paradoxically, the problem of widespread violence or anarchy. In large part, 
this is because there are other extra-legal mechanisms and informal arrangements for 
conflict resolution.
VIII. CONCLUSION
Personal autonomy itself, one of the values that sustain democracy and justifies 
the Rule of Law, is the best guarantee that we can believe in to ensure that people 
create the potential of democracy. In this way, the Rule of Law continues to provide 
an essential service, hence its absolute importance.
The view supported in this document constitutes a commitment in favor of 
democracy, an approach that transits through the Rule of Law. Firstly, the deepening 
of this is an alternative way, one of undisputed importance, to advance democratic 
consolidation, whilst also deepening its quality.
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Secondly, both democracy and the Rule of Law are betting on the autonomous 
individual: endowed with rights, intelligent, knowledgeable, able to decide, able to 
carry out their own decisions. The Rule of Law acts as the defense of fundamental 
rights, the same as is required for democracy. Therefore, through the expansion of 
personal autonomy, the Rule of Law reinforces the conditions that make democracy 
possible, and through them, it strengthens and deepens democracy itself.
Through the autonomy of people, democracy can build public truth through 
dialogue and consensus-based on beings’ hindsight, experiences, and different ideas. 
Thus, democracy cannot bet on forbidden hunting grounds or areas of the undecid-
able. It will deny one’s own bet in favor of intelligence, the ability to decide for the 
informed, and self-commitment of people. 
If we hold a conception of people based on autonomy and freedom, we cannot 
avoid those people deciding what rights they want to include in the Constitution and 
how to implement this, and then find the formula that best lends itself to defend 
them, but without violating democratic principles.
Peru and Ecuador are passing through a period of institutional instability that 
has affected their governance and their guarantees of democratic consolidation. These 
countries have not managed to establish a government that meets minimum require-
ments of effectiveness and legality. In large part, this is because A Soft Rule of Law 
system was predominant for years in both countries, so that today it is necessary to 
question the feasibility of creating a democratic state of law and overcoming the 
prevailing Soft Rule of Law in both countries.
A solid Rule of Law instead of Soft Rule of Law is essential for Peru and Ecuador 
to add stability and predictability. In addition, it is through legal rules as the place 
and role of each of the acting subjects in a more developed context (political parties, 
public authorities, citizens, media, etc.) is delimited.
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Resumen: 
Este artículo efectúa una revisión teórica del término Rule of Law (que 
puede entenderse como ‘Gobierno conforme al Derecho’) y el concepto de 
Soft Rule of Law (‘Estado de Legalidad’). Se centra en los derechos huma-
nos como un elemento esencial del gobierno conforme al derecho; además, 
la interacción entre la democracia y los desafíos que enfrenta el gobierno 
conforme al derecho en una democracia consolidada. Finalmente, a modo 
de ejemplo y con propósito descriptivo, presenta una breve reflexión sobre 
los problemas institucionales actuales de Perú y Ecuador, relevantes para 
entender las interacciones el Rule of Law y el Soft Rule of Law.
Abstract: 
This article refers to a theoretical revision of the term Rule of Law and 
the concept of soft rule of law. It focuses on human rights as an essential 
element of the Rule of Law, the interaction between democracy and the 
challenges faced by the Rule of Law in a consolidated democracy. Finally, 
as an example, it introduces a brief reflection on the current institutional 
problems of Peru and Ecuador, pertinent for a better understanding of the 
interactions between the Rule of Law and the Soft Rule of Law.
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Estado de derecho; Estado de legalidad; estudios constitucionales compa-
rativos; derechos de propiedad; derecho y economía.
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